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Introduction
Many people who feel genuine moral concern for the 
world reach for a conspiracy theory to explain why and how 
it is the United States can engage in foreign activity that 
is hypocritical of American values and destructive of third 
world people and of the planet. I will consider this form 
of explanation as given by Noam Chomsky. I will ask 
whether the conspiracy theory gives a true and accurate 
account of the present political reality or not. The texts 
The Culture of Terrorism2 and The Chomsky Reader3 will be 
used as the guides for this consideration. Both are 
written by Chomsky, who is without question a leading 
proponent of this form of explanation. The first part of 
the paper is a largely sympathetic report on the conspiracy 
theory as Chomsky gives it. The second part presents a 
review of the recent literature surrounding Chomsky1s 
political work. And the third section offers a criticism 
of Chomsky's position in the light provided by the device 





Noam Chomsky begins a recent book, The Culture of
Terrorism, written in the wake of and in response to the
Iran-Contra affair, with the sweeping statement that
American foreign policy is not guided by universally
beneficial or even benign goals. Instead, the policy is
guided by a "Fifth Freedom" and most references to such
things as democracy and liberty, made in reference to the
international agenda, are but empty gestures designed to
secure the status quo:
The central— and not very surprising— conclusion 
that emerges from the documentary and historical 
record is that the U.S. international and 
security policy, rooted in the structure of power 
in the domestic society, has as its primary goal 
the preservation of what we might call the "Fifth 
Freedom" understood crudely but with a fair 
degree of accuracy as the freedom to rob, to 
exploit and dominate, to undertake any course of 
action to ensure that existing privilege is 
protected and advanced. This guiding principle 
was overlooked when Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
announced the Four Freedoms that the U.S. and its 
allies would uphold in the conflict with fascism: 
freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom 
from want and freedom from fear.5
This statement will surely jar many Americans who have 
come to believe that America engages in only noble foreign 
activity, for the idea that the American government can act 
contrary to the ideals of open democracy and freedom does 
not correlate with the portrayal of America as the keeper 
of the free world. Many Americans think that America can 
fail in its objectives but only insofar as the means to
those ends are incompletely carried out, e.g., the American 
failure to commit the resources necessary to win the 
Vietnam war. But for Chomsky, the noble causes for which 
America believes it stands are but larger than life semi­
truths used to maintain public ease with the present 
course.
This is indeed a radical and, some would no doubt say, 
blasphemous conception of the American government and its 
relationship with the world and its own public. Chomsky, 
nonetheless, takes great pains to detail this 
conspiratorial outlook. Much of the Culture of Terrorism 
is devoted to the articulation of how, when, and where the 
United States government has said one thing to the people 
at home and pursued nearly the opposite abroad.
Chomsky gives many examples of the tendency to say one 
thing and yet do another. An example which stands out is 
the government's handling of the Arias plan. This 1987 
regional plan called for moves towards democracy on the 
part of all Central American nations, the idea being that, 
if the Central American states and Nicaragua, in 
particular, were to act democratically, the U.S. would be 
obliged to discontinue its support of the Contra army 
operating on the Nicaraguan frontiers, and the Central 
American nations would be bound to pursue peace. But 
Chomsky claims it was the intent of the Reagan 
administration to "sabotage the Arias plan."6
Chomsky reveals the diplomatic maneuvering on the part 
of the Reagan administration to substantiate his point. He 
shows how Philip Habib worked with the Duarte government of 
El Salvador to halt the first proposed meeting of the 
Central American nations, set for June 1987, and how the 
Reagan administration created their own peace proposal and 
presented it on August 5, only one day before the Central 
American leaders were to meet again to discuss the Arias 
proposal. The Reagan plan called for unilateral 
disarmament on the part of Nicaragua in return for an 
American promise not to arm the Contras. This is not the 
kind of proposal one would expect an independent and 
rational country to accept, and, in fact, the Central 
American leaders brushed it aside in favor of their own 
policy. For Chomsky, and for many others, these attempts 
to intercede in Central America demonstrate the Reagan 
administration's true intention of subverting the peace 
process in Latin America. And these diplomatic activities 
of subversion, though by no means the most atrocious acts 
carried out by the United States, according to the book, 
show how the American government carries out a hypocritical 
foreign policy. For the government has stated all along 
that it seeks real democracy in Nicaragua. Yet, when 
democracy was about to be put into place, following the 
Arias plan, the United States subverted it, because, 
according to Chomsky, the U.S. ability to dominate in the
region would be iessened if the Central American nations 
were to act, for the first time in this century, 
independently of the United States.7
The honest question that readily comes to mind is
"Why?": "Why is the domination of Central America of such
importance to the American government that it would be
willing to undermine the internationally applauded peace
initiative and introject its own proposal in such an openly
hypocritical fashion?" Chomsky gives his answer by
pointing to the needs of the powers that be. He takes the
conspiratorial view that American foreign policy is guided
by the wish to subdue for the purpose of easy gain. This
subjugation of third world people stems from the need of
those in power to dominate and to maintain their authority
while the end product of easy gain, be it economic or 
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political, stems from the principle of greed. But Chomsky 
insists that this greed is not the greed of the American 
people per se. It is the greed of the wealthy elites who 
control the capital and means of production in the American 
technological society.8
These elites are the leaders of business and politics, 
and they conspire, using the forces available to them, to 
act against the intentions, aspirations, and moral values 
of the American people. The means used by these people 
range from the covert activity of the C.I.A. and F.B.I. to 
the subtle but ever-effective maintenance of the prevailing
ideology of power and greed in the schools, as is
evidenced, according to Chomsky, by the emphasis on
business education in the high schools and universities.9
Of course, Chomsky acknowledges that the United States
is not the Soviet Union; and, therefore, the means of
control must be very different from the blatant use of
force and deceit once found there. For, if anything, there
are a number of important laws and judicial decisions
guaranteeing free speech and procedural justice in the
United States. But these rights can be subverted, provided
that the right forms of propaganda are employed by the
elites. Chomsky says:
To pursue programs that are conceived and applied 
in these terms, the state must spin an elaborate 
web of illusion and deceit, with the cooperation 
of the ideological institutions that generally 
serve its interests.10
One such method that the elites employ to implement 
the structural culture of terrorism is to manipulate the 
people by appealing through the mass-media to the deep- 
seated emotions of patriotism, righteousness, anger, and 
fear. Chomsky argues that the elites use these emotions to 
suppress any dissent that may arise, for these emotions 
have the power to bring people together under one leader 
and under one policy. Chomsky would like his audience to 
realize that this mass manipulation of public emotion is 
occurring much of the time and at all levels of culture.
The favorite emotion employed in this service, he
maintains, is fear:
There is a classic method for obtaining the 
acquiescence of the public to policies it 
strongly opposes: induce fear. If the populace
can be led to believe that their lives and 
welfare are threatened by a terrible enemy, then 
• they may accept programs to which they are 
opposed as an unfortunate necessity.11
If Chomsky were to apply this to the recent
presidential elections, he might well say that the election
of George Bush was made possible by the appeal to the fear
of the American population over crime. That is, Americans
voted for Bush (former director of the C.I.A.), because his
anti-crime posture served as a response to the elite-
controlled-media-generated fear over crime even though the
American people tended to agree with Dukakis on many issues
of importance to them.
Another favorite method employed by elites to quell
dissent Chomsky terms "damage control."12 This phenomenon
occurs when part of the conspiracy has been exposed, take
for instance the Iran-Contra part of the world-wide
conspiracy. The objective for the elites is to keep the
people from realizing the full scope of the conspiracy.
The elites allow one figure to become a prominent
scapegoat. The scapegoat takes the public's attention away
from the real issues and the more powerful elites as he or
she falls from public grace and view. Ollie North, of
course, serves as the paradigmatic example of this
phenomenon. And to Chomsky's credit, the Iran-Contra
Affair report indicates that this was at least considered
by the conspirators:
According to North, a 'fall guy' plan was 
proposed by Casey in which North and, if 
necessary, Poindexter, would take the 
responsibility for the covert Contra support 
operation and diversion.13
Chomsky refrains from saying that the mass media are 
blatantly controlled by the elites. Rather, he claims that 
there is a prevailing ideology or an alliance of power 
which supports the status quo through the institutional 
structures of the mass media. He does not spell this 
ideology out, except to suggest it rests with such American 
ideals as peace, prosperity, and freedom— so long as these 
ideals are not taken too radically. By too radical Chomsky 
means that so long as the American people do not expect 
these ideals to be applied across the board and with 
equality, for, if they were radically applied, the rule of 
the elites would be threatened— and the elites simply would 
not allow this. Chomsky assumes that Americans have a 
sense of this prevailing ideology and, therefore, they know 
what is safe and not safe to do in the country. Thus, the 
prevailing ideology of American values, taken as a smoke 
screen for greed, becomes a structural entity. And the 
elites that control American institutions continue to act 
behind this screen with little regard for American values. 
Hence a young and bright journalist must decide whether or
not he or she will write the truth and be fired or continue 
on with the safe course of middle-of-the-road journalism 
and live a reasonably secure middle-class life. The 
prevailing ideology that permeates and oppresses modern 
life will force this disquieting question by way of the 
already corrupted editor, and it will typically ease the 
journalist into the middle class. This is Chomsky's 
suggestion, but he declines to define the ideology.
Instead, he gives proof of its existence by pointing up its 
concealed presence and its all-pervasive force to explain 
the atrocities carried out by the U.S. government.15
Perhaps we can create a juncture by stopping to look a 
little deeper at Chomsky's basic vision which surely is 
emerging. At the most basic level, the American people are 
duped into supporting activity which is contrary to their 
moral beliefs by clever and manipulative people whose only 
intentions are to maintain their power and feed their 
greed. These people are conscious of their roles, yet they 
do not take seriously the moral aspirations of the American 
populace. In fact, by spurring the people into emotional 
positions on difficult international questions and by 
giving thoughtful people in middle-class jobs ideological 
ultimatums the elites develop and reinforce a concealed but 
recognizable culture of terrorism. Yet, if we examine this 
form of explanation we find a number of assumptions that 
are given relatively little consideration in Chomsky's
work. This neglect on Chomsky's part is of a piece with 
the lack of clarification given the notion of the 
prevailing ideology. The assumptions are: 1) the
conspiracy really goes against the wishes of the American 
people, 2) the elites have the power to organize themselves 
and to institute a huge and largely invisible conspiracy 3) 
there is a prevailing ideology that dampens whatever 
resistance may hinder the elites' projects, and 4) if the 
people were alerted to these covert activities they would 
use their political liberties in mass and change the 
government and its policies. But before taking on these 
assumptions it will be beneficial to summarize the 
positions taken by recent reviewers and critics of Chomsky, 
so as to place this essay in the current political 
conversation.
II
Recent reviewers of Chomsky's political work have 
focused their criticisms in three areas. The first area of 
criticism centers on the notion that Chomsky undervalues 
the complexity of the international predicament, and, 
therefore, the reviewers hold, his moral critique of the 
U.S.'s use of terror fails in being too simple to account 
for the facts. The second type of criticism centers on 
Chomsky's strident tone and his unwillingness to engage in 
honest dialogue with the representatives of the status quo.
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The third area of criticism focuses on the question of 
whether or not Chomsky's model of conspiracy misses the 
center of responsibility for the atrocities and whether or 
not his model presents a misleading vision of the 
relationship between contemporary domestic politics and 
American foreign policy.
Recent reviewers in The Economist16 and The Times 
Literary Supplement17 give examples of the first critique.
The Economist, in a short, unsigned review, points out 
Chomsky's notoriety, stemming from his work against the 
Vietnam War. The article likens him to a "curious insect," 
"preserved in amber."18 By these statements I presume the 
authors mean that he remains singularly determined to voice 
his moral grievances as he did during the Vietnam war, even 
though his audience can no longer be rallied by one 
dominant issue. The article notes Chomsky's consistency by 
noting his equal moral outrage over both the U.S. war on 
Vietnam and the Soviet war on Afghanistan. But, for the 
reviewers, this type of consistency is only an "anarchist's 
consistency."19 The Economist reviewers give him a further 
"curious" stamp by questioning his moral vision, given the 
complexity of the international questions. The article 
asks rhetorically: "So no American intervention (in
Vietnam), no boat people? Then why did millions migrate
• * 20 from north to south Vietnam m  the 1950's?" By leaving
the question open, the answer is presupposed. Thus, by
their refutation of his credibility in terms of his factual 
analysis, Chomsky is nudged toward the intellectual 
periphery. It ought to be noted that this type of 
criticism fuels the outrage of Chomsky and his followers, 
for The Economist’s criticism subtracts simple morality, 
which normally places limits on social activity, from the 
international political reality. Thus, the elites are left 
the room to develop their own destructive policies which 
serve only their power and greed.
Charles Townshend of The Times Literary Supplement 
criticizes Chomsky on the same grounds. Townshend notes 
that Chomsky sees aggression as pivotal to any American 
foreign policy decision, and that Chomsky "refuses to 
accept that any such policy can have been conceived or 
executed in anything but a spirit of unwavering hostility 
to the people." Chomsky argues that the destruction of 
foreign people is a conscious goal of policy, but,
Townshend continues, "such a conclusion misses the 
complexity that constitutes the problem."21
The second area of criticism which focuses on 
Chomsky's tone is formulated by both Townshend and Brian 
Morton of The Nation.22 Townshend terms Chomsky's form of 
argument "exiguous" in that the arguments start from their 
conclusions and fire one atrocity after another at the 
reader until the reader is inoculated, convinced, and 
outraged as well. Townshend echoes other liberals when he
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states that Chomsky is so convinced "of the righteousness 
of his perceptions that he is impervious to criticism,
[and] unreachable in discussion."23 This point no doubt 
presents a problem, for public interchange is critical to a 
functioning and well-intentioned democratic nation.24
Brian Morton who calls Chomsky "a national hero" for 
his efforts during the Vietnam war notices the stridency of 
Chomsky's tone as well. In his article "Chomsky Then and 
Now" Morton illustrates the changes that Chomsky underwent 
during the 60's, 70's and 80's as reflected in his 
writings. In the 1960's, Morton shows, Chomsky sought 
public debate and was working to participate in what John 
Dewey calls the "give and take" of political exchange.25 
But by the late 1970's, Morton writes, "The dominant 
feeling of the . . . [work], as I read it, is anger."26
Perhaps this anger can be traced to the dispersion of 
his audience due to the American withdrawal from Vietnam.
For as The Economist reads it Chomsky "retains his 
conviction that if he shouts loud enough the crowd, which 
must be out there somewhere, will materialise again."27 
This possibility gains its credence from the fact that, if 
only for a while, Americans were rallying against moral 
atrocity, big business, and a lying, mischievous 
government, and that during this period, Chomsky was a 
forceful and articulate leading intellectual. But this is 
no more. The crowd, once doused with water canons and tear
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gas, is now controlled by the "newspeak" of the modern
» • 28 press and irresponsible liberal intellectuals. These
forces, no doubt bearing blame, are now granted power of
oppression that surely must be preventing the mass from
forming again against the powers that be. But Chomsky's
argument fails to convince the majority. And his voice
becomes shrill and, sadly, isolated.
The third area of criticism, found in the recent 
literature, is not as elaborately presented as the 
preceding two. Yet, it is mentioned in at least three 
recent articles, including Morton's.29 Meril Rubin of the 
Christian Science Monitor30 asks whether Chomsky's 
allegations of thought control and oppressive conspiracy 
really illuminate the issue and whether Chomsky, as Peter 
Osborne of the New Statesman suggests, "over-generalize[s] 
his critique of American political science?"31
These final questions, I believe, are the most Useful 
questions to be asked of Chomsky, and, unfortunately, 
although they are asked, none of the reviewers attempt to 
answer them thoroughly. They are, at any rate, the 
theoretical questions that are the subject of the third 
part of this essay.
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With his vision briefly stated and the reviewers taken 
into account, I can turn to an examination of the above
enumerated assumptions in the light provided by the device 
paradigm. But first it should be noted that Chomsky does 
go to great length to call to our attention the nature of 
American activity abroad and the types of contradictions 
these activities create with our stated ideologies of 
peace, democracy, and human rights. Americans may have 
vague notions that their government has done little to 
rectify the situation in Central America. Chomsky shows 
very precisely how it is that America has blundered away 
opportunities for progress and how the official policy has 
promoted brutal dictatorships. Nonetheless, by looking at 
Chomsky's assumption from the insight which the device 
paradigm gives of contemporary life, it will be found that 
the conspiracy theory, which he uses to explain the 
American government's atrocious foreign record, gives an 
inaccurate account of what really guides American foreign 
policy and of the American people's involvement in it.
The first assumption that the conspiracy goes against 
the best intentions of the American people must be granted 
to Chomsky right off. For if the American people found the 
activities that Chomsky calls to our attention acceptable, 
there would be little reason to consider the conspiracy 
question. People could only wonder why a few elites were 
trying to hide something from them which they thought was 
quite all right to begin with. But assumption number two 
brings more difficulties.
When the enormous organizational problems that the 
minority elites would have to tackle, if they indeed ran 
the country, are considered, it seems the elites would need 
a shared operating secret that would bond them in their 
activities and that could not be revealed to the public.
The conspiracy secret, for example, could never be leaked 
to the public due to feuding or other interelite conflicts 
of whatever kind. The secret bond would have to be kept 
completely within elite circles. Yet, this seems 
impossible, for it is known that people come in and out of 
money via luck and misfortune. Yet, it is never heard said 
that someone could not become an elite because he or she 
could not partake of the elite's controlling secrets. In 
fact, if there are shared elite secrets, they seem to stand 
under one publicly accepted heading: the heading of
prosperity understood as affluence.
Of course, American collective experience with 
Watergate and Iran-Contra gives the people good reason to 
suspect that there is a conspiracy. But the question here 
becomes "What is the scope of the conspiracy?” "Is it as 
encompassing as Chomsky means to suggest?" Both scandals 
constitute conspiracies against the law and the best 
intentions of the people, but in each case the conspiracy 
was limited to a small, closely-knit band of government 
officials and self-interested operatives. In neither case 
can one find evidence of the type of world-encompassing
17
conspiracy on the part of the elites that Chomsky would 
like to suggest. And in the case of the Reagan 
administration conspirators, they seem too individualistic 
to organize an impenetrable group.
Thus, with the huge organizational problems facing the 
elites, the elites must have some other mechanism, besides 
the powers they hold as elites, to institute their world­
wide conspiracy. Chomsky gives such a mechanism. He calls 
it the prevailing ideology. And this is where the notion 
of conspiracy gains it credibility, for the ideology is not 
held by elites only, rather it becomes a structural entity. 
We could call it the mix of wishy-washy bourgeois 
liberalism and strident neo-conservativism which so 
dominates the U.S. political landscape. In any case, the 
ideology is biased towards the status quo and it serves to 
blind people to the truth of what is occurring, both at 
home and abroad. Chomsky speaks of this ideology as if it 
were a framework for social life, leaving no room for 
dissent that could possibly prevail upon the elites to 
change their ways and the course of American foreign 
policy. It is my contention that the device paradigm, as a 
conceptual tool, can spell out this ideology more 
precisely.
The device paradigm tells us that modern life has a 
twofold character guided by the promise of technology.32 
This twofold character shares many essential qualities with
a technological device. The technological device, such as 
a personal printer, contains a hidden machinery that 
produces an easily available commodity, that being printed 
material. As a citizen of the technological world, one 
knows little about the machinery except that it secures the 
product which one expects of it. And this expectation is a 
natural expectation in our day, for technology has brought 
with it the great promise of disburdenment and prosperity. 
In the particular case of the printer, people are 
disburdened from having to write with pen and paper, and 
they share in the prosperity of generally available printed 
material. On the large scale this twofold character of the 
device and the promise of technology has shaped the reality 
of the modern world as well.
The twofold character comes to determine the way 
citizens of the advanced industrial countries live in work 
and play.33 For they work in the machinery of the 
technological society, be it in private business or the 
public sphere, and in each area they work to secure widely 
available, safe, and easy commodities. The machinery 
becomes invisible once the people are at home, for there 
they have left their work lives behind. And once they are 
at home they are free to engage in the leisure activities 
of their choice. In keeping with the promise of technology 
these activities are considered prosperous and are no doubt 
disburdening.
Prosperity has come to mean the affluence surrounding 
the ownership and consumption of freely available 
commodities in the private sphere. While, disburdenment 
has come to signify freedom from engagement with those 
parts of life which once gave the technological world's 
device-counterparts their character. For example, in the 
case of shopping, people are now disburdened from 
encountering snow in the town center (counterpart). And 
now they are free to shop in climate-controlled and muzak- 
saturated shopping malls (device). In this freedom from 
engagement and through affluent consumption, provided by 
the technological machinery— which grows more concealed and 
sophisticated by the day— we find the prevailing ideology.
The prevailing ideology is articulated in the pattern 
of the technological device. But it is not something 
instituted by the elites, whoever they may be. Rather, the 
twofold character and the promise of technological life 
have been accepted, bought into, and affirmed and 
reaffirmed by the people of the United States and the other 
industrialized nations. This is the sad fact that Chomsky 
has difficulty facing. He recognizes that the character of 
contemporary life is critical to the lack of change seen in 
America in areas of moral concern. But, he does not deal 
with it directly. He takes the easy path and gives the 
responsibility for this life-style-ideology to the elites, 
who surely implement it for their own financial gain:
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Part of this effort has been to create a certain 
conception of 'the good life1 at home . . .  a 
conception that happens to conform to the needs 
of the wealthy and privileged sectors that 
dominate the economy as well as the political and 
ideological systems.34
Chomsky is trying to say here that Americans would not 
buy microwaves and televisions and motorhomes if it had not 
been for the elites who manipulated them by creating a 
conception of the good life. It is possible that Americans 
have been duped into a life of dubious quality by 
advertisers and businessmen. But it is not only these 
elites who have done the duping: moms and dads, and aunts
and uncles, and neighbors and competitors have all played 
their role in the duping. The fact is Americans accept the 
promise of technology. Americans love the new-fangled 
things of whatever sort. This acceptance, though changed 
and refined with the times, has a definite character.
The fact that prosperity is central to the American 
conception of the good life was affirmed by the recent 
election of George Bush. He asked Americans: "Are you
better off today than you were eight years ago?"35 And the 
majority of Americans responded "Yes." And by responding 
yes, Americans tacitly affirmed the technological culture 
and its promise of prosperity and disburdenment.36 This 
point contradicts the notion that Americans voted for Bush 
because of elite-generated fear. And it is a point that 
should not be taken lightly, for, by voting with their
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pocket books, Americans once again affirmed the rule of 
technology as the prevailing ideology of modern life.
Where does this leave us in terms of American foreign 
policy and the failure of the U.S. government to live up to 
its ideals? It points to the fact that because the 
American government is charged with the responsibility of 
maintaining the structure of society, it must maintain the
characteristic divisions and benefits of the paradigm. And
since the paradigm itself has no intrinsic morality,37 there 
are no immediate requirements for morality placed on those 
who maintain the paradigm. There are some moral 
expectations placed on the leaders of government, but they 
are very often a burden to social planning, rather than a 
guide to planning. Thus, Americans can back murderous 
dictators like Pinochet in Chile and Marcos in the 
Philippines until the people catch up with the moral 
monstrosities these leaders commit and demand that their 
government shun them on moral grounds. But there can be no 
doubt that the American government will not interfere with 
dictatorships so long as they are stable and continue to 
promote, through their economic activity, however small, 
prosperity here in the U.S.38 This is a decidedly dark side 
of the American love affair with prosperity and the culture 
of technology. And it points to the complicity of the 
American people in these atrocious behaviors.
This is a difficult subject, because Chomsky's first 
assumption that the acts of government go against the best 
intentions of the people must be accepted. Yet, the 
acceptance of this assumption stands against the idea of 
complicity only at the surface. The American people are 
not such amoral creatures that they openly sanction death 
squads, torture, and C.I.A. proxy armies. What Americans 
do sanction is the culture of technology, which is 
completely committed to prosperity in the U.S. People, in 
this commitment, continue in their disengaged leisure 
activities such as shopping and watching t<v. Most issues 
outside this realm tend to become fuzzed. This is 
especially true in areas of foreign concern. For these 
concerns are furthest away from the immediate machinery/ 
commodity life-style. And the debate that occurs is not 
only distant, but complicated. Surely, one cannot expect 
someone busily watching "Wheel of Fortune" to drop Pat 
Sajax and find impartial materials on Central America and 
come to a decision. Americans must do so, however, if 
democracy is to work and if Americans want their government 
to stop working for the collective appetite and to act from 
moral intentions instead. Chomsky sees that Americans are 
avoiding these troublesome issues in favor of commodious 
activity; and thus the hypocrisy and atrocities continue. 
But to fit the character of modern life into his conspiracy 
scheme, he offers that the elites, who control television,
give the people entertainment, such as professional
sports,39 so that they do not have the time to investigate
matters of international moral importance, and, thereby he
avoids acknowledging that Americans in their tacit
acceptance of the device paradigm share in complicity with
the governmental leaders in American foreign affairs. But
even Chomsky, at his more thoughtful moments, recognizes
that it is finally the choice of Americans to tune in
sports rather than the debate on C-Span:
The gas station attendant who wants to use his 
mind isn't going to waste his time on 
international affairs . . .  So he might as well 
do it where it's fun and not threatening—  
professional football or basketball or something 
like that. But the skills are being used and the 
understanding is there and the intelligence is 
there [for informed decision making].40
This leads to Chomsky's fourth assumption: that the
American people, if informed of American atrocities abroad,
would surely demand a change of the government and its
policies. This is another difficult question. The
American people do receive information about death squads
in El Salvador and Guatemala, and they have been informed
about the American government's support of the "democratic"
dictators there. Yet, Americans continue to do far too
little. This fact leads to the conclusion that Americans,
for the most part, will not necessarily act when evidence
is presented to them of atrocities. Accordingly, the
American people must be held morally responsible along with
the leaders who institute foreign policy. Of course, as 
the above analysis shows, the issues outside the personal 
economic and consumptive sphere tend to become fuzzy, 
especially when the official line of the conservative 
government interprets the atrocious events as regrettable 
but understandable and when the people are disengaged from 
the complex world in their passive leisure activities.
And, it is the distortion of the moral condition by the 
government which leads people like Chomsky to urge the 
conspiracy theory as a way to account for the dull response 
of the populace. But it remains, that in the age of 
information, the American people can gather the documents 
necessary to explore the questions themselves. They are 
not barred from libraries, nor are they banned from 
receiving information from Oxfam, Amnesty International or 
other world-monitoring or relief organizations. And once 
people make individual decisions, the Bill of Rights grants 
them the political liberties needed to inform their 
friends, relatives, and political representatives without 
fear of reprisal. It is still the case that unpopular 
views could lead to one's firing, disenfranchisement, or, 
in extreme cases, death, but these horrible results are 
definitely not the normal repercussions for choosing to 
take a political stand against American-sponsored 
repression and terrorism abroad. The person who works as 
an insurance salesman in Tigard, Oregon will not be exiled
from the community for gathering facts and holding a 
neighborhood meeting to discuss the Latin American 
situation. He or she is more likely to be seen as an 
oddity, for this type of exercise of one's political 
liberties simply does not occur with any frequency at all. 
If people were to organize themselves in such a way or even 
were they merely to wonder about their country's moral 
commitment in the world, they would, without question, have 
a marked effect on the government and its policies.
But, Americans do not exercise their political 
liberties in ways similar to the one sketched above.
Rather, as the twofold character of modern life tells us, 
people continue to live roughly half of their lives in 
disengaged activities such as watching t.v. Since 
Americans affirm this way of life repeatedly, and since 
they are implicated in the technological culture, by their 
own consent, it can only be concluded that Americans, by 
their unwillingness to act on the difficult international 
questions, accept the course set by the current government, 
and, therefore, they must be held as accomplices in the 
moral atrocities committed by the American government and 
its client states. This is a harsh judgement. But, in 
consideration of the suffering of the people of the world 
and the failure of affluent Americans to gather, apply and 
distribute their personal and material resources in ways
26
which are both possible and practical, this judgement 
cannot be avoided.
Chomsky clearly understands that Americans have a 
moral responsibility to the world that they are failing to 
live up to. He works passionately to wake Americans up 
from their sleepy--consumer paradise with the plain and 
horrible facts. He knows that, if Americans wake up, they 
can change the nation, as they did with the equal rights 
and anti-war movements of the 1960's. But, when Chomsky 
charges that the elites are putting the people to sleep, he 
is really crying out in despair over the truth that the 
Americans, having heard the faint murmuring of injustice 
and suffering, turned over in their beds and flipped off 
the lights, thinking to themselves "I'll deal with it 
tomorrow." Tomorrow has not yet come. The culture of 
technology continues to provide the comfort necessary to 
sleep in relative peace.
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A Hegelian Analysis of Malcolm Lowry*s Imperial Consul1
History shows that the Western nations, including the 
United States, have engaged in imperialism. Imperialism is 
characterized by the use of military or economic force, by 
the bringing of law to the "savages" and the wilderness, 
and by the economic exploitation of the conquered people 
and the land. In all these instances domination by one 
group of people over another group is the unambiguous 
result. I shall explore this phenomenon by considering 
imperial domination in the light provided by Hegel’s 
Master/Slave dialectic and by considering a specific 
literary character who epitomizes many of the features of 
the imperial Master consciousness in the hope of drawing a 
practical moral lesson for ourselves.
* * *
Hegel gives his picture of the domination and 
assertion of one group at the expense of others in his 
Phenomenology.2 In the section on the Master and Slave, 
Hegel argues that the Master seeks to assert himself at the 
expense of others in a vain attempt to find freedom of his 
self-consciousness by standing as lord over others. But 
paradoxically once the Master asserts himself over others, 
he becomes dependent on the others/Slave.3 In fact the
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Master's freedom depends on the Slave for its very 
existence, because without the Slave the Master cannot 
actualize his self-consciousness as different from and 
superior to the consciousness of others.4 This is 
troublesome for the Master, because the more the Master 
works to bend the Slave to his will, the more flimsy his 
freedom becomes. Taking this logic to its conclusion, we 
find that were the Master to obliterate his others, to 
achieve the most radical freedom of self (Hegel called this 
pure negative freedom)5, he would discover his freedom to be 
meaningless, for the dominance itself would be meaningless.
At a disturbing level this phenomenon is found in the 
United States' dominance of Latin America. The United 
States holds Latin America in economic and political 
slavery, and, in so doing, asserts its world dominance.6 
Yet this dominance, true to the Hegelian analysis, remains 
relative and precarious. For as Paul Kennedy notes in his 
recent book The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: "Whether a
nation be today mighty and rich or not depends not on the 
abundance or security of its power and riches, but 
principly on whether its neighbors possess more or less of 
it."7 And this dominance is precarious insofar as many of 
the Latin American nations are at the brink of economic 
calamity, threatening the loss of billions of dollars in 
bad loans for the United States. Here we see the 
dependence of the Master on the Slave for his identity.
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For the Master becomes distinguished by the act of 
asserting his relative superiority at the Slave’s expense. 
And yet the Master becomes more frail in this relationship 
because of the existing danger that the system of dominance 
and submission will break apart with the collapse of the 
slave. Because of this danger the first world must 
continually work to control the slave nations.8
Of course U.S. power will remain for many years to 
come. Latin America does not wield the military nor the 
economic means to rival the leading power of the world.
Yet the U.S. asserts its superiority, often violently, over 
Latin America. And in doing so it becomes comic. The 
comic stance of the leading power is not a purposeful act 
meant to amuse; rather the comicality of its dominance 
stems from the fact that it believes itself to hold the 
moral high ground in relation to Latin America, whereas, in 
reality, it has not held it and does not hold it. The U.S. 
stands as comic in a contradiction of believing in its 
moral superiority and acting contrary to it.
The contradiction of American belief and action (call 
in m and ~m) leaves the comic nation with only an empty 
idea of itself as the law bringing nation (e.g., John 
Wayne) over the lawless "heathens" of the Third World. To 
bring this morally contradictory and, therefore, empty law, 
the U.S. must pose a taxing structural apparatus, e.g., the 
U.S. army in Panama, or the Contra army in Nicaragua, in
to ensure that the countries of Latin America remain 
economically, militarily, and politically committed to the 
programs of the United States, its government, and its 
people.
The strategic ideas behind the Contra war demonstrate 
this fact. It is fairly well known that the Reagan 
administration sought to weaken the Nicaraguan government' 
ability to provide social and economic benefits to its 
people by forcing it to fight a war and to withstand an 
American trade embargo. The policy succeeded in pushing 
Nicaragua back into the direct sphere of American 
influence.9 The American president claimed the moral high 
ground when justifying his policy by reiterating the cold- 
war position that the U.S. was fighting Communism and its 
exportation. Yet, despite the legitimacy or illegitimacy 
of this claim, the president did not attempt to argue for 
or even to discuss the virtue of the overthrow of the 
repressive Somoza regime nor did he attempt to argue for 
the planned economic, social, and cultural reforms of the 
Sandinista government in Nicaragua. In this regard 
American moral rhetoric was empty, for it was empty of 
specific and enlightening content regarding the actual 
situation in Nicaragua. At the same time the U.S. 
continued to arm, feed and organize the Contra army.
This activity cost Americans some money, but more 
importantly it left the U.S. President in a ridiculous
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position, thanks to the Iran-Contra affair. For after this 
government fiasco became public, the picture of a nation 
governed by the bumbling and disengaged Ronald Reagan 
became extraordinarily clear.
The position of the U.S. as a nation with a 
contradictory moral identity and as a comic nation lead by 
a bumbling presidency falls in line with the Hegelian 
analysis. For as Hegel realized the "master has an 
intuition of the supremacy of his single being-for self.
But although he certainly has this . . . it is a sublation
• • • » 10which occurs within others" and not himself. It is the
U.S. that dominates, but the dominance is dependent. It is
the U.S. that claims the moral high ground, but it is a
moral claim that is contradictory and hollow. Furthermore,
Hegel showed that the Slave in the "privation and fear of
the Lord makes . . . the transition to universal self-
consciousness."11 Surely Nicaraguans did not gain full
freedom through their revolution, but they did demonstrate
the moral willingness and courage to work and fight for
moral, economic, and political self-determination. And
despite their recent turn towards stoic acceptance of their
dependence on the U.S., with the recent election of the UNO
government, Nicaragua continues to demonstrate, as an
exemplar of Latin America, a moral strength that the U.S.,
despite its rhetoric, cannot match. One need only look to
the statistics of low voter turn out and towards the
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vacuous and crudely seductive advertising that passes for 
political debate in the U.S. to verify this assertion.
The tendencies of the Master/Slave relationship, 
articulated by Hegel and found in the Third World's 
relationship with the United States, can be found in 
Malcolm Lowry's tragic character, Geoffry Firmin.12 In 
fact, through a careful reading of Under the Volcano we 
find in Firmin a character in the Hegelian mold of Master, 
who, in his role as retired British Consul, comes to a 
tragic demise. His tragic flaw, in the classical sense, 
lies with his inflated status as Consul of the British 
Empire and his inability to encounter the world, except as 
the towering but comic master. The tragedy gains poignancy 
in that he becomes aware of his position and disability, 
but he is finally unable to change his course to stave off 
his fate. Moreover, as a particular instance of the Master 
consciousness, the Consul gives us insight into the 
relationship of the Master and Slave which characterizes so 
much of our own relationship with the Third World, and in 
particular, Latin America.
* * *
The story of Under the Volcano centers on Geoffry 
Firmin's reunion with both his wife Yvonne and his brother 
Hugh on the celebatory "Day of the Dead." Yvonne divorced 
Firmin in the United States, after she fled him to pursue
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her acting career. Hugh failed to discover a place for
himself in the Spanish Civil War, and he came back to his
brother some time before Yvonne's return. The three of
them, after some preliminaries, head off for the festival
in Tlaxcala. The novel reveals their thoughts, histories,
and interactions as the fateful day wears on.
The Consul has immediate difficulty adjusting to his
wife's unexpected return, and in the course of the day he
continues to search, find, and consume larger and larger
guantities of more and more potent alcohol. Hugh and
Yvonne discuss the problem of the Consul's incessant
drinking and obliteration of their reunion. But they fail
to reach Firmin. He is cloaked in his alcohol and is
untouchable. But they recognize that the Consul stands as
a representation of a larger folly, a larger obliterating
drunkenness that makes his condition understandable but all
the more impervious.
What's the good? Just sobering him up for a day 
or two's not going to help. Good God, if our 
civilization were to sober up for a couple of 
days, it'd die of remorse on the third. 3
The Consul, ever strong, continues, and "the best
thing about [him] was his deceitful air of infallibility."14
He will not let remorse overtake him--neither for his lost
love nor for his lost opportunity at honest interaction.
Yvonne comes to Quauhnahuac, which the Consul,
incidentally but importantly, calls "home," to be with him
in a marriage. But the Consul, when confronted by Yvonne’
hopefulness and forgiveness drinks Tequila and
felt his mind divide and rise, like two halves of 
a counterpoised drawbridge, ticking, to permit 
the passage of . . . noisome thoughts [of 
Yvonne].
"Your heart darling?” she asked anxiously.
Nothing—
"Oh my poor sweetheart, you must be so weary."
"Momentito," [the Consul] said, disengaging 
himself.15
And so it is, speaking in Spanish, the Consul disengages
himself from Yvonne. And the hope of reunion is dashed by
his own lapse, his own disconnection.
The Consul is disengaged from the Mexicans as well.
He is unable to associate with them on anything but
official levels or from the standard imperial position of
pity. When he does look at them in a non-Consul way they
become indistinguishable and unknowable.
As he looked it was as though these figures were 
gathering silently together. Now they had become 
one figure, one immense, malevolent creature 
staring back at him.16
The Mexicans are a mass, unarticulated, and 
frightening. Firmin dissolves the world around him into 
this mass. But, as the Consul, he continues to stand, 
precariously, with his stance secured by his position, 
tequila, and the hallucinogenic mescal. Yet as the 
Hegelian analysis shows, once the Master gains such a high
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freedom at the expense of the Slave, he becomes more
dependent on the Slave. And as the Master becomes more
dependent, his position becomes more comic.17 This is what
life becomes for Geoffry Firmin. For in their own way,
Geoffry*s Mexican help makes a mockery of his power and
status. When they come to work at his estate,
How gay were the Mexicans! The horticulturists 
made the occasion as they made every possible 
occasion,a sort of dance, bringing their 
womenfolk with them . . .  as though the whole 
thing were a movement in a comic ballet, 
afterwards lolling about in the shade . . .  as if 
the Consul himself did not exist.18
Thus, mockingly, the Mexicans move about their business,
knowing that though they depend on the Master for their
work, they are more engaged and freer than he supposedly
is. Whereas the Master can not break from the negative
freedom provided by his comic dominance, the Slaves can
freely perceive the Master's dependence and artificiality.
From this knowledge they are gay and dancing, while the
Consul stumbles along, searching for his next drink— his
greatest source of differentiating power.
The text shows that the Consul is aware of his role of
Master and of his task of promoting his free consciousness
articulated in opposition to the Slave. The Consul
realizes that his is a "battle for the survival of human
consciousness.1,19 Of course, this is his self-deception.
His is not human consciousness per se, but a particular
Master consciousness.
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There was not even a consistent basis to his 
self-deceptions. How should there be then for 
attempts at honesty? "Horror,” he said. "Yet I 
will not give in." But who was I, how find that 
I, where had "I" gone? "Whatever I do, man is 
unconquerable.1,20
The Consul will return to this refrain. He will search for 
"I" but he cannot find it apart from his huge will which is 
backed, of course, by his status as retired Consul of the 
British Empire. Like the Hegelian Master-consciousness he 
determines his consciousness in differentiation from the 
other, not in conjunction with the Mexicans. He does not 
find his identity in the richness and difficulties of life 
with his friends and with nature. He finds the basis for 
his life instead in his primitive strengths, both physical 
and official, as he finds his bearings in the difficult 
situation along the road to Tlaxcala by "the cars that both 
bore upon their rear number-plates the sign 'Diplo­
matic© 1 . "21
Yet, it must be remembered that the Consul quit his
diplomatic post. In his conversation with M. Lauruelle, he
shows his realization of his and the imperium's
predicament.
He was pointing with his tennis racquet. "The 
slow darkening of the murals as you look from 
right to left. It seems somehow to symbolize the 
gradual imposition of the Spaniards' conquering 
will upon the Indians . . ."22
The Consul removes his dark and forbidding glasses during
this conversation, revealing something of himself: his
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face and his eyes. He knows that they are the Masters, "a
kind of latter-day repercussion of the conquest."23 But
despite his knowledge the Consul cannot change his ways
fast enough. Yvonne awaits his love, his care, and his
honesty. But the day will not bring them together.
As the day passes and his world turns confusingly,
Firmin reaches out in prayer. But, he prays by will alone.
He speaks to himself:
"Raise your head, Geoffry Firmin, breathe your 
prayer of thankfulness, act before it is too 
late." But the weight of a great hand seemed to 
be pressing his head down.24
Whose hand is it? Possibly it is God's or fate's. But
more plausibly, it is the weight of the imperial culture
which gives Firmin the institutional apparatus to apply his
hardened will. It gives laws and the ideology of power
mastery to him. And it is its negative imperial power
which pushes his head down, just as the gravity of the life
of imperialism presses itself down on the Slave nation.
This gravity determines economic, military, and other
events beyond any one person. How can a man, in one day,
overturn the "weight of such a heritage?"
While thinking of his life and of his brother,
Firmin's brother Hugh comes to a moment of realization that
proves especially appropriate for the Consul's condition:
[He] looked out of the window. Well after all 
. . . the queer thing was, that love was real.
Christ, why can't we be simple, Christ Jesus, why 
may we not all be brothers? 6
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Such a simple idea: love. But an idea impossible to 
implement with sheer exertion. Love requires care, 
nurturing, and patient forgiveness. These qualities are 
lacking in the Consul's world. The law can not encompass 
them.27 They are too simple, too alien to the imperial 
world. The imperium stands above these qualities and opts 
for economic efficiency through exploitation. Love only 
•exists in the dancing and gay slaves, for they realize the 
folly of dependent mastery.
Near the climax of the novel, the Consul has separated 
himself from Hugh and Yvonne. He wanders into a brothel 
where he orders mescal. It is there that he experiences 
his last haunting thoughts of Yvonne in the cacophony of 
the Mexican mass other. But, "deliberately he shut out all 
thought of Yvonne. He drank two swift mescals: the voices
ceased.1,28
Alcohol delivers him. He can no longer see straight 
or even talk like the retired Consul that he is. His 
engagement with reality has turned into the fantasy of 
being William Blackstone amongst the Indians. But even his 
fantasy reeks of the imperial. He can not separate himself 
from being the Consul to be who he is: Geoffry Firmin, an
Englishman, standing in a wild Mexican brothel on a rainy 
night— the night of the dead. Instead he is William 
Blackstone, William the Conqueror, or William Shakespeare—  
it does not matter. He is a self unable to relate to
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others, even as the Consul. He is selfless, not because of
religious redemption, but because of his achievement of
pure negative freedom through the alcoholic obliteration of
the world. The Slave, that the Master so depends upon,
exists no longer. Following (this obliteration, his end
comes quickly. He utters one last prayer:
"Please let me make her happy, deliver me from 
this dreadful tyranny of self. I have sunk low; 
let me sink lower still, that I may know the 
truth. Teach me to love again, to love life."
But the prospects of becoming humble and actually
encountering29 his wife were too immediately demanding of
the servant of His Majesty.
"Let me be truly lonely, that I may honestly 
pray. Let us be happy again somewhere, if it's 
only together, if it's only out of this terrible 
world. Destroy the World!."30
He returns to his imperialist and irrational refrain. And
this time his prayer will be answered. His world will be
destroyed. He is shot, and he falls in lonely terror down
the ravine.
* * *
What does the Consul's demise say about us, a 
civilization drunk on the disengaging reality of 
consumptive goods provided by modern technology? It surely 
shows that in our drunkenness we have become both blind and 
comic, a pathetic picture. Our national interests are 
secured abroad with little regard to human suffering. And
43
we are too dazed by MTV and the like to give enough thought 
or care to the problem. Our leaders stammer about calling 
for the establishment of democracy and basic political 
rights in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and elsewhere, while many 
in the world laugh at our posture, considering our past and 
present abuses.
Knowing the condition, how should we make changes, 
before we suffer our own tragic demise?31 Perhaps we can 
find an answer with the Consul. One available opportunity 
to change for the Consul rested with his marriage.32 In a 
good marriage the subjugation of the other is clearly a 
false and doomed way of being united. Surely, a marriage 
goes through moments of dominance and submission. But at 
its best, it is a caring encounter between two committed 
people. Yvonne as we saw desired this (though in a 
problematic form), yet the Consul, tragically, could not 
respond. For the Consul such an alternative was too 
counter to the mentality of the Master for him to grasp, 
especially while obliterating the frightful world with 
alcohol. For in the frightful chaos of his hallucinogenic 
world, the only stability he could find was in the imposed 
order of the imperium, an order which is false and, at 
least in the moral sense, doomed.
Wendell Berry makes a sober claim for marriage in his 
essay "People, Land, and Community."33 In it, he draws an 
analogy between a marriage and farming. In farming, as in
marriage, one enters the relationship with faith. Faith is 
necessary because one never knows what such a serious 
decision will bring. In both the case of farming and the 
case of marriage, people act on their faith by bringing 
good care and attention to the other (husband, wife, or 
pasture). Berry points out that this faith is not
something that covers days, but years. The yields from a
recovering hillside or a developing family may take ten, 
twenty, or twenty-five years. Still, people must keep 
their faith and continue their works. The marriage 
relationship requires such commitment; otherwise, it would 
dissolve, along with its promise and hope for today and for 
the future.
Perhaps the model of marriage will not guide us on 
every front. But it stands as an alternative. And, 
insofar as belief in the tragic view (i.e., the belief that 
the tragic fate is the fate of all men; ergo, there is
nothing we can do to change our fate), cannot be a
practical concern, in that such a belief only leads to 
resignation and cynicism, we should try to correct the 
flaw, which the Consul had so deeply imbedded in himself, 
in ourselves. At the very least, the marriage model would 
be superior to the "our backyard"34 syndrome, where Latin 
America is relegated to the sandbox of imperial culture.
To look at Latin America and its particular countries as 
participants in a union of equals would be far more
productive, for it would allow both parties to move to 
higher stages of development, instead of allowing only the 
slave to move on.35 The marriage model would also demand 
that the imperial culture relinquish its control and set 
aside its law in order to integrate and exchange with the 
culturally different. The exchange, of course, should not 
only be in consumer goods, but of heritage and 
understanding, gradually shared and gained through a union 
of interests and aspirations, undergirded with respect for 
and cultivation of difference.
Such a change will require that the people of the 
United States recognize themselves as members in the world 
community whose real worth depends not on the degree of 
control which they exercise abroad, but in their caring, 
non-violent, and devoted presence and energy which they 
bring to the world, through their institutions and 
governing bodies. If the U.S. were to act in such a way, 
the response of the world would be positive. And perhaps, 
eventually, respect for the United States would replace the 
current stoic acceptance of Western hegemony that is now 
common amongst the people of the world. And, furthermore, 
if the United States were to apply its power while in a 
position of respect, due to its genuinely positive moral 
contributions to the world, it would be understood within 
the context of a positive familial relationship. So long 
as the act was not arbitrarily violent or oppressive and so
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long as the world could perceive the rationale supporting 
the use of power, the U.S.'s assertion of power could be 
meaningful and positive. This possibility does not mean 
that the U.S. should ever stop listening to the concerns, 
complaints, and hopes of people of different cultures; if 
the U.S. did decide not to listen to the people of the 
world, then the use of arbitrary power would no longer be 
only in the background, rather it would become a threat to 
the people of the world once again.
Of course, a positive condition such as this requires 
a fundamental and difficult adjustment on the part of the 
people of the United States. Obviously, the Consul fails 
in this regard with Yvonne. For he cannot redefine 
himself, apart from his imperial position or fantasy. He 
obliterates the world, and, sadly, so do we in many ways.
But hope for our situation can be found where the Consul 
fails in his relationship with Yvonne. For if we apply 
principles found in the basic and successful marriage to 
the presently abusive relationships of which we are a 
dominant part, perhaps we could move into the light, out 
from the loveless and lonely darkness which marks so much 
of Geoffry Firmin's world in Under the Volcano.
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The Question of Free Expression 
at the Privately Owned Shopping Mall1
This essay is broadly about the conflict between the 
liberties of free expression and property ownership. 
Specifically, it is concerned with this conflict in 
relation to the shopping mall. Over the past thirty years 
the shopping mall has become an undeniable center of public 
commercial activity, and, as such, the mall has been an 
attractive place for those wishing to express political 
ideas. However, these quasi public places remain, for the 
most part, privately owned. And, the mall owners have 
sought to exclude political activities in order to foster a 
pleasant commercial atmosphere at their malls. In this 
conflict between the rights of free expression and private 
ownership many cases have found their way to the courts in 
search of resolution. One non-theoretical task for this 
essay is to trace this conflict as it has been framed, 
resolved, and revised by the U.S. Supreme Court in order to 
demonstrate the practical way in which this issue is 
handled by the political institution entrusted with 
protecting liberties.
But what is of interest to philosophers lies behind 
the case law surrounding this issue. Philosophical 
questions (such as "In a conflict of liberties, which
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liberty should carry the most weight?” and "Where should 
the court look for answers when precedent conflicts or is 
non-existent?") have demanded principled answers that could 
provide a stable foundation for the resolution of any 
future conflict over this issue.
These philosophical questions have been raised and 
answered by Ronald Dworkin. And the first part of this 
essay is largely concerned with restating his jurisprudence 
so that it is readily applicable to the case law which 
follows in the second part.
Criticisms of Dworkin's proposals in general have been 
many and varied. This essay will not, however, attempt to 
reconcile Dworkin with his critics, nor will it attempt to 
argue thoroughly for his fundamental position. Instead 
this essay will be an application of Dworkin's legal theory 
to the specific Constitutional problem which the series of 
cases discussed herein represent. To serve this end, the 
writings of Dworkin's critics will be used only to 
distinguish his critical suggestions.
The third part of the essay will consider which course 
the court ought to have taken at the crucial moment in the 
development of the case law. It will become clear that the 
Court changed its position on this issue in a very 
fundamental way without, at the same time, addressing the 
basic and difficult issue of how these liberties should be 
balanced when they are in conflict. To accomplish this
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end, this essay will rely again on Dworkin's jurisprudence 
and, in particular, on his notion of justification in the 
process of adjudication.
I
Ronald Dworkin's analysis is familiar to many, for his 
arguments have appeared in books, journals, and in such 
periodicals as the New York Review of Books. Aside from 
his clear analysis and prose, his greatest contribution to 
legal theory is the notion of the place that principles 
hold in the rule of law. For Dworkin and his followers, 
laws are not crafted by judges who have ranging discretion, 
when the rules of the case law precedent fail to extend to 
the case at hand.2 Rather, judges, who act responsibly, 
draw upon principles as well as rules when making their 
decisions. These principles are not invented by judges; 
they are principles which the larger political community 
accepts and which can be readily extracted from the extant 
legal materials.3
Much of the criticism surrounding Dworkin's position 
comes from those who believe that there exist no stable 
principles for the guidance of legal decision making, 
whether inside or outside the law, and that all principles 
that exist must be fought over in the various legal arenas, 
including the courts, by the many interest groups which 
constitute contemporary society. Thus, these critics hold,4
law cannot be separated from politics, and there exists no 
such binding principles to guide the decisions of judges.
We will take this position into greater account in the 
third part, but for now let it be sufficient to note that, 
according to Dworkin, these critics miss the decisive fact 
that people before the courts have the right to expect that 
the decisions affecting their lives be made in accord with 
past political decisions reached by various political 
bodies in publicly authorized ways. Principles serve to 
bind past political decisions to contemporary legal 
decisions in such a way that were a judge to act 
arbitrarily, he or she would be acting irresponsibly.5 
Without such responsibility there could be no political and 
cultural integrity.6 For people expect to be governed under 
the expressed principles of the political community. These 
expectations make it very difficult for a judge or law 
maker to act without regard to the past or to principles.7
Furthermore, the principles themselves will serve to 
focus the debate surrounding an issue and to guide the 
decision making process towards a generally acceptable end. 
Take, for example a city council person in Missoula,
Montana. He or she would find it very difficult to 
implement a law banning the right of people to express 
their opinions on the editorial pages of the Missoulian 
newspaper, because such an act would be contrary to the 
principles of freedom of press and speech. Likewise were
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the council person to attempt to limit the right of farmers 
in the valley to own horses, he or she would undoubtedly 
fail because of the Constitutional right of property owners 
to do what they see fit with their property. In both of 
these cases the courts would require a compelling state 
interest to support these political proposals, for to 
sustain them would be to breach the integrity of law which 
our community understands itself to live under.
These two examples serve to illustrate that people 
come to recognize the rule of law in its principled 
features in addition to the specific rules which regulate 
the life of the community. And by abiding by the larger 
principles, even if this means challenging some particular 
rule or narrow principle, say by civil disobedience, the 
public reaffirms the importance that principles hold in the 
life of the community.
The fact that judges hold positions of political 
responsibility requires them to make decisions that 
maintain the integrity of the community, just as do the 
city council representatives.8 The judges must adhere to 
and reapply principles as they come to decide cases in law 
where the factual precedent fails to settle the case before 
the court. Dworkin calls such cases "hard cases." For the 
judge must weigh the rights of the parties in terms of the 
principles which support their positions and come to a 
difficult or "hard" decision.9
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Principles do not arise from nowhere, and judges are 
not expected to invent them. Principles have arisen and 
developed throughout the history of the political 
community, and judges play a role in their articulation as 
well as interpretation.
The principles of free expression and private property 
ownership are two liberal political principles that arose 
in modern form with the Enlightenment and its philosophical 
emphasis on the individual. They became established in law 
in England and the United States through particular 
political acts of citizens, legislators, and courts.10 In 
the U.S. the early American Congress established the 
principles of expression and property ownership in the bill 
of rights of the Constitution. With these rights written 
into the Constitution, and also established elsewhere, the 
rights became part of the institutional morality of law; 
from this position their effect on the debate and 
interpretation of legal questions and precedent become 
firmly and undeniably established.
In the process of moving from what were initially only 
liberal philosophical ideas to fixed and institutionalized 
principles at work in law, the key element has been the 
interpretation of prior law in terms of principles. This 
interpretation follows a certain methodology. Yet, 
according to Dworkin, most judges rely on their experience 
and knowledge to approximate the following methodology
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without making its features fully explicit.11 Nonetheless, 
judges do employ the conceptual aspects of Dworkin's model 
when deciding difficult cases.12
Methodology
The judge, when deciding a difficult case, acts like 
an author in a chain novel, according to Dworkin.13 An 
author in a chain novel must fit his or her particular 
possible turn of the plot on the preceding chapters of the 
book. An author cannot simply break the continuity of a 
character capriciously. He or she must read carefully the 
prior work for its expressed continuity and meaning; then 
he or she must continue the development of the novel in way 
that is consistent with the story's development and which 
enhances the philosophical or moral substratum of the work 
in progress. To perform such work requires an analytic 
knowledge of the characters and their relationships as well 
as an interpretive understanding of the moral world-view 
which emerges from the story and the interactions of the 
characters.
If an author were continuing the novel Brave New 
World, it would be difficult for him or her to write the 
final section with the Savage living out his life in 
cynical retirement on the Falkland Islands as proposed by 
the Controller. For although this continuation could 
surely be made to fit the story, it would fail to give the
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character of the Savage the dimensions of care, love and 
intensity for human life, which contrasted so sharply with 
the soma-consuming public and the cynical genius Mustafa 
Mond. In short the novel would become a cynical story 
about human nature, instead of a moral indictment of people 
handing over their humanity in return for the consumer 
comforts of the Brave New World.
In much the same way a judge must carefully interpret 
the case before him or her for fit within the context of 
law and for its moral world-view in order to make a 
decision. To do this the judge must initially consider the 
various possible outcomes of the case based on the 
competing claims made by the parties involved. The judge 
must also consider the possible outcomes in relation to the 
relative precedent and to the principles found in the case 
law. The judge must look to the closely related cases in 
order to see which outcome fits the principles that emerge 
from the precedent (or which support the precedent). Once 
the judge makes these first judgments about the competing 
claims, he or she may have a number of possible outcomes 
which roughly fit the related precedent. At this point the 
judge must expand his consideration outwardly to see how 
the possible outcomes measure up with the political 
morality expressed in other, closely related fields of 
law.14 From such an effort the judge will begin to see the
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relative place of the competing claims within the larger 
general area of law.
It may be that in certain difficult cases where 
precedent is uncertain and the principles suggest several 
alternative solutions that the best decision may be a so- 
called "brilliant account." A brilliant account brings to 
the surface some supposed principle which may not have been 
articulated prior to the case at hand. Justice Douglas 
gave such a brilliant account in Griswold v. Connecticut.15 
In this famous case Justice Douglas identified the right of 
privacy in the penumbras of the first, third, forth, and 
fifth amendments to the Constitution. Before this Supreme 
Court decision, the right of privacy did not exist 
explicitly in the body of Constitutional law. It was not 
until Justice Douglas made his brilliant "discovery" that 
the people of the United States obtained explicit 
Constitutional protection of privacy.16
Once the judge has expanded his or her consideration 
to include other fields of law and once the judge has 
sought justification of the possible outcomes based on the 
morality which emerges from the extant legal materials, the 
judge must give the competing claims another test. For it 
may be that the institutional morality provides several 
different but plausible solutions which are incommensurable 
and yet justifiable. The judge must ask: "Which
interpretation shows the community as a whole in the best
light?" This is the most difficult test, for at this point 
the judge must turn the interpretation toward the community 
to determine whether the decision that the judge is 
considering is worthy of the political, historical, and 
moral tradition which the political community believes 
itself to be striving for and, to a certain degree, 
achieving. It is as if the novelist, having ruled out a 
number of possible interpretations and plot lines for a 
character based on the character's place in the story, must 
now decide which of the two remaining plots to choose. He 
or she knows that this line must bring the story towards 
its fruition and conclusion, while, at the same time, 
fostering and enhancing the moral significance of the story 
on the whole. The judge in his or her turn must ask "Does 
this decision show the United States to be a nation of 
greed or charity? A nation of freedom or tyranny? A nation 
of moderation or intemperance?" and so on. Questions such 
as these enlarge the scope of the final consideration to 
include both the history and the political ideals of the 
nation.17
According to this analysis a judge could make a 
mistake in deciding a case in two ways: 1) he or she could
make a mistake of fit by neglecting some important argument 
of principle found in the legal morality, and 2) he or she 
could make a mistake of justification by neglecting to
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address the deep and important moral issue which the case 
at hand manifests.18
With the review of Dworkin's jurisprudence completed, 
we can turn now to the case law relating to the exercise of 
free speech in the shopping malls.
II
The development of the case law in this area began 
with Marsh v . Alabama. which was heard in 1945.19 It 
involved a Jehovah's Witness woman who distributed 
religious tracts in the downtown area of Chicksaw, Alabama. 
The Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation owned Chicksaw and it 
forbade such activities on its property. Thus, her 
activity attracted the Mobile County Sheriff, who was 
employed by the company. She was ordered off the street.
She refused and was arrested on trespassing charges. She 
later contended, in the Alabama Court of Appeals, that her 
rights to freedom of expression and free expression of 
religion under the first amendment had been violated. The 
Alabama court rejected her claim and let stand the 
trespassing conviction. She appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.
The Supreme Court faced a difficult question insofar 
as the rights of property owners to exclude people from 
their property and the right of freedom of speech and 
religion were in conflict. It was clear to the Court that
6 1
were Chicksaw publicly owned, the question would have been 
easily decided in favor of the petitioner, based on . 
precedent. But since the town was privately held, the 
question became foremost a matter of principle.
The Court began its reasoning process by noting that
the downtown area of Chicksaw was connected to government
>services, namely the post office, the state highway, and 
the county sheriff. The Court continued by noting that the 
people of Chicksaw used the place as they would any 
downtown area, and that if Chicksaw were not privately
owned, the first amendment rights of the petitioner to pass
* • • ?0 peacefully religious literature would have been protected.
The Court then framed its decision around the question "Can
residents be denied their rights to freedom of religion and
expression because Chicksaw is privately owned?" The court
answered negatively.
In its response to this question the Court followed
principles which were found in the prior case law. These
principles served as premises for its decision. The first
principle enunciated was that ownership does not mean
absolute dominion.21 The Court then stipulated the specific
idea that "the more an owner, for his advantage, opens up
his property for use by the public in general, the more do
his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and
constitutional rights of those who use it."22 The court
stated further that since the facilities were built for the
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public, i.e. it served a public function, the facilities
were subject to regulation.
By establishing the fact that property owners could be
obligated by law to allow activities that they would
initially disallow on their property, the court turned to
one practical point and one philosophical principle to
bolster its argument. The practical point held that no
matter who owned the town, the community had an interest in
keeping the channels of communication free. For to act as
good citizens, people must be informed, and to be informed,
exchange of ideas must be uncensored.23 The philosophical
principle held that
[wjhen we balance the constitutional rights of 
owners of property against those of the people to 
enjoy freedom of press and religion . . .  we must 
. . . remain mindful of the fact that the latter 
occupy a preferred position.24
This is an undeniable judgment on the high value of 
speech relative to the constitutional rights of property 
ownership. The Court in weighing these rights considered 
both the Constitutional law and the larger political 
morality.25
The dissent presented a "flood gate" argument, holding 
that the principle of the Marsh decision would allow people 
to remain on private property against the will of the 
owner. To dam the flood, the dissent offered that in the 
future the principles of Marsh should be limited to the 
facts of the case only. The dissent further argued that
63
the appellant could have carried out her activity somewhere 
else and that the state did not have the moral duty to 
provide "opportunity of information."26 Although the 
dissent did not say this explicitly, it was clearly their 
intention to limit the future force of the principle of 
Marsh.
The principle of Marsh was extended to the shopping
mall by the Supreme Court in Amalgamated Food Employees
Union Local 590 et al. v. Logan Valiev Plaza Inc. et al.27
This case focused on whether the food workers' union could
picket at a privately owned shopping center complex. The
Court framed the question in such a way that the opinion
centered on the issue of competing Constitutional rights.
For as Justice Marshall's opening sentence stated:
This case presents the question whether peaceful
picketing of a business enterprise located within
a shopping center can be enjoined on the ground
that it constitutes an unconsented invasion of 
• 28 property rights.
The Court's argument proceeded as follows. First the 
Court asserted that speech in a place generally open to the 
public is protected, absent other limiting factors. These 
other factors include time, place, and manner restrictions 
which could be imposed to regulate activity of the 
expression itself. Secondly, the court held that if the 
Logan mall had been a sidewalk of a municipality, speech 
would have been protected due to the historical use of town 
centers as a place for discussion and debate of political
issues.29 Thirdly the Court noted that the fact that speech 
can be regulated (i.e. for time, place, and manner) does 
not necessitate that speech must be barred. Fourthly, the 
Court, relying on Marsh, held that despite the fact that a 
place is privately owned, the place may still be treated as 
though it were public for certain purposes. And fifthly, 
the Court established that the mall was "clearly the 
functional equivalent" of a central business district of a 
municipality.30 From these premises the Court concluded 
that it could not find any reasonable ground to deny the 
first amendment rights of the petitioners, thereby 
overturning the lower court's injunction.
Clearly the logical necessity of this argument depends 
on the choice of equating the mall with the central 
shopping district. In order to establish this claim fully 
the Court added to its argument the historical fact that 
the malls had taken on the role of the central shopping 
district when the people of America migrated from the 
country and the cities to the suburbs.
A final interesting point was made by Justice Douglas 
in his concurring statement. He noted that there was 
something essentially unfair in considering the mall "a 
sanctuary from which some members of the public may be 
excluded merely because of the ideas they espouse."31
In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner32 the Court changed its 
position considerably. This case centered on the question
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of whether a group of protestors had the right to pass out 
leaflets opposing the war on Vietnam in the privately owned 
Lloyd Center mall. The District Court and the Court of 
Appeals held that the protestors' first Amendment rights 
were protected following the precedent of Marsh and Logan, 
but the Supreme Court overturned their decisions and broke 
with the principles of Marsh and Logan in the process.
In its long opinion the Supreme Court did not argue as 
methodically as did it did in the Logan decision. Rather, 
it attempted to recharacterize the mall as primarily a 
private place designed with commercial purposes in mind.
To serve this recharacterization the Court emphasized the 
utilitarian and aesthetic aspects of the mall from the 
commercial and consumptive points of view. This emphasis 
was, and is, clearly at odds with the political and 
cultural vision of the mall-as-town-center which the Court 
used in Logan. Yet, in order to overturn Logan, the Court 
acknowledged that it had to address the equivalence of the 
mall to the towncenter. But first the Court determined 
that the scope of Logan was limited. The Court based this 
position on the footnote number 9 in Logan which reserved 
the possibility that future decisions could bar "picketing 
which was not . . . directly related in its purpose to the 
use to which the shopping center property was being put."33 
From this language written into the Logan decision the 
Court could avoid applying the principle of Logan directly
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to Lloyd. And thus the court was given an opening from 
which to address and question the position that malls are 
essentially equivalent to central business districts.
The Court, however, did not directly address the 
principle of Logan. Instead the Court traced the principle 
to Marsh and found that the Marsh decision stood on 
peculiar facts relating to a company-owned municipality 
only. The Court then claimed that the Marsh decision was 
an anomaly of the past; and, thus, the principle of Marsh 
could be dismissed as largely irrelevant to the new 
historical development of the privately owned shopping 
mall. The development of the notion of "functional 
equivalent" found in Logan was dismissed by the Court, as 
well, because of the possibility, left open in Logan. of 
limiting the principle to speech related to the mall34 and 
because the Court believed the business district language 
in Logan to be "unnecessary."35
To bolster its position, as it did in Logan. the Court 
made a number of points. First it reiterated that the 
handbilling had no relation to the mall and that the 
respondents could have acted politically elsewhere.
Secondly, it argued that the respondents misinterpreted the 
scope of the invitation given to the public by the Lloyd 
corporation.36 Thirdly, the utilitarian end of the mall as 
a place designed foremost for commercial transactions was 
asserted. Fourthly, the Court noted that the difference
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between a small store and a large mall was only a 
difference of degree, not of principle, implying that were 
the principle of Logan to be extended, small business could 
be required to allow speech on their premises.
Near the end of the opinion, the Court addressed the 
deep question of whether expression or private ownership 
ought to prevail. The Court acknowledged the special place 
of the first amendment in Constitutional law. But the 
Court added that it never granted the right to free 
expression on private property,37 and that property does not 
lose its private character simply because the public is 
invited on it. Thus, the Court ruled in favor of the fifth 
amendment over the first, largely because it reasoned that 
the first amendment was not applicable to the facts.
In Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board et al. 
the Court addressed the question of whether or not union 
members had the right to picket their employer, the Butler 
Shoe Company, in the North DeKalb Shopping Center in 
suburban Atlanta. This case would at first glance appear 
to fall within the guidelines of note number 9 in Logan, 
but the court argued that, in fact, Llovd completely 
overruled Logan and set a new precedent in the process.
The Court first argued that the Constitutional right 
of free speech is only good against the government. Thus, 
the decision in Marsh was not only an anomaly in fact, but 
in principle as well. The Court acknowledged that Lloyd
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left parts of Logan intact, including the notion that 
speech could be allowed in the privately owned malls. But 
the Court claimed that this position was contradictory and, 
in fact, the Llovd decision was a defacto rejection of
XQLoaan.
To make this claim the Court once again relied on the 
note number 9 to Logan. In this case the Court claimed 
that when the Logan Court offered the possibility that the 
content of speech in the malls could be regulated to 
include only speech relevant to the mall itself, that the 
Logan Court had erred, because speech, as protected by the 
first amendment, cannot be lawfully regulated for content 
alone. And thus, since Logan left this question open as a 
condition in its decision and since Llovd did not allow 
speech ostensibly unrelated to the mall, the Hudgens Court 
concluded that free speech could not be allowed at the 
shopping malls at all, for to do so would be to regulate 
the content of free expression.
Ill
The case law shows clearly that in Marsh the Court 
articulated the right to freedom of religion and press at a 
privately owned town and that in Logan the Court extended 
this basic principle to cover speech in shopping malls. In 
fact, the Court in Logan developed a certain test for 
whether speech ought to be allowed in a privately owned
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mall (i.e. the "sufficiently public" criterion). But in 
Lloyd and Hudgens the Court managed somehow to unseat the 
principle of free expression in shopping malls. And in its 
place the court asserted the contrary principle that since 
the malls are intended for commercial use, the owners of 
malls could regulate the content, as well as the time, 
place, and manner, of any expression on their property.
To perform this overthrow the court relied extensively 
on footnote number 9 to the Logan decision. Thus, this 
section of analysis and criticism will begin by considering 
the type of reasoning surrounding note number 9 and the 
implications of this form of reasoning for jurisprudence.
The essay will then proceed to apply Dworkin's response to 
this form of reasoning and its implications, in relation to 
the case law discussed herein, so that a final reassessment 
and criticism of the Court's actions can be made.
When the Hudgens Court made its decision on note 
number 9 that the Llovd ruling was a defacto rejection of 
the principles of Logan and Marsh. it argued that because 
speech could not be regulated for content and because note 
number 9 regulated for content (a contradiction) and, 
moreover, since Llovd disallows most all content, that no 
speech for any purpose could be exercised freely in 
shopping malls. The Court, however, consciously or 
unconsciously missed a subtlety in its reasoning process. 
That is, if the argument of Hudgens is correct, and courts
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cannot rule on the content of speech, then the Court could 
very well look on footnote number 9 as an error itself. If
the note was held as an error, it appears the Court could
have disregarded it and moved on to further apply the 
principles of the earlier decisions, for the Llovd court 
would have lacked an opening from which to restrict the
content of speech in the shopping malls.
Thus, it is clear that the Hudgens Court had two 
possible logical outcomes from which to choose when forming 
its opinion. The first, which it chose, overruled the 
rights found in Marsh and Logan and asserted the fifth 
amendment rights of property owners. The second, which it 
perhaps negligently omitted, would have allowed the first 
amendment principles to stand. This is a tricky legal and 
logical point, but when we bring the logic to the surface, 
we see that just below the reasoning lies the principles of 
free expression and property ownership. These principles 
could not be considered directly by the Hudgens Court, for 
they were already weighed relative to each other in Logan 
(with free expression rights found to be the heavier of the 
two). Thus the Court masked its deep choice with a logical 
point, ironically neglecting the demands of logic and 
avoiding the central issue in the process.
Such an obvious breach of principle in the case law 
seems to support the position of Dworkin's critics who 
claim that there is no guarantee that principles will
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remain stable in law in the face of attacks from clever 
partisans.
Dworkin's Response
Based on the analysis of the first section, three 
basic responses can be safely assumed in answer to the 
questions which the case law presents. The first response 
would be that the Supreme Court simply acted in an 
unprincipled manner by breaking the "story line" of Marsh 
and Logan with the legal sophistry of Llovd and Hudgens.
The second response would be that there are principles 
present in the law which are equally weighty and possibly 
contradictory from which the Court could and can choose 
from in reaching its decisions. The third response would 
be that although it appears that the first and fifth 
amendments are irreconcilable in this case, there does 
exist a deep political theory which can resolve the 
complicated conflict.
The first response asserts that a mistake was made by 
the Court in Llovd and Hudgens. if the idea of principled 
interpretation of legal precedent is to be taken seriously. 
For it is quite clear that the Lloyd and Hudgens decisions 
break the continuity of the case law which began with Mash 
and Logan. The justices were aware of the breach; but, the 
majority of justices were able to find legal materials to
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support a wholly different decision. This fact leads to 
Dworkin's second and, eventually, third responses.
Dworkin second response can be found in his 
realization that at times Justices will cause a principle 
to fall into disuse by weakening its scope and force.40 
This appears to be the case with the Llovd decision.41 For 
with the Lloyd decision the Court managed to recharacterize 
the mall as a place for commercial purposes and to limit 
the scope of the principle of Marsh and Logan. This 
understanding on the part of Dworkin would appear again to 
support the position of Dworkin's critics. For here 
Dworkin would be acknowledging that the institutional 
morality of law alone is insufficient to guarantee a 
continuous and principled narrative of law. But as the 
earlier recollection of Dworkin's jurisprudence shows, 
Dworkin does accept the fact that the law, without recourse 
to the political morality of the community, will bring 
contradictory rulings. Dworkin does show that the judge 
can clarify the legal materials by asking questions such as 
"Which decision is supported by the bulk of legal 
material?"42 But questions such as this are not meant to be 
definitive, only helpful. The deepest test is to be found 
in the judge's appeal to the community's larger political 
morality.
Yet many critics of Dworkin, such as Andrew Altman, 
hold that the very idea of judges looking to some
definitive external political morality and finding a 
fundamental answer is little more than empty idealism.43 
Altman points to Alasdair MacIntyre's position that modern 
industrial society suffers from incommensurable moral world 
views which make political and cultural disagreement 
interminable.44 The implications of this criticism for 
Dworkin's jurisprudence are obvious: if the moral world
views found in society are incapable of settling deep 
disagreements, then any morality chosen by a judge to 
justify his or her decision can only be accomplished at the 
expense of another, competing moral world view. And if the 
judge chooses one political morality over another to 
justify his or her decision, he or she is only doing so 
from his or her personal bias. Further, if any legal 
decisions are settled by the judge's personal bias, the 
place of objectivity and fairness in the legal realm is 
greatly reduced, and the legal world becomes merely a 
battleground for competing interests.
Dworkin turns away from such a ''disquieting" 
perspective.45 He turns instead to John Rawls, whose 
philosophy generally encompasses competing interests in 
society.46 It is Rawls' theory which forms the substantive 
part of Dworkin's third response.
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Rawls
In his essay "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus," 
John Rawls argues that following the post-Reformation Wars 
of Religion the primary and guiding political doctrine has 
been the principle of toleration.47 The principle of 
toleration allows for a "diversity of general and 
comprehensive doctrines, and for the plurality of 
conflicting, and indeed incommensurable, conceptions of the 
meaning, value, and purpose of human life . . . affirmed by 
the citizens of democratic societies.1,48 This encompassing 
moral view lends itself to a "long-run equilibrium" of 
social unity over the generations in which people come to 
accept the basic idea of political differences.49 These 
differences, displayed and debated in public, will be 
deepened and modified by a process of debate over the 
generations.50
If this conception is accurate, then the struggle of 
the incommensurable moral views can be understood as a 
vital competition in which the competitors still share a 
central agreement on the long-run common good. What 
remains at the most basic level of political culture and 
philosophy is the belief that tolerance is necessary to 
preserve this healthy competition of interests.51 But can 
the idea of tolerance be used by judges to answer difficult 
legal questions such as the one discussed herein?
Tolerance can be seen as an intuitive first step 
towards solving the problem of conflicting liberties. And 
if we look to Rawls' A Theory of Justice we can find there 
a prescription for solving the deep legal issue at stake in 
the case law.52 From the imaginary original position we 
learn that rational people, when unaware of their fates 
once they enter society, will adopt the most just system of 
liberties and fair system of institutions and distribution 
of goods that they can. Since each person is unaware of 
whether or not he or she will be in the minority or 
majority, politically powerful or weak, and so on, each 
individual would seek the greatest available liberty. From 
this idea Rawls postulates the first principle of justice: 
"Each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty 
for others."53 But Rawls recognizes that unrestricted 
liberties will naturally collide, and that, as a result, 
they must be restricted to avoid conflict.54 This 
restriction must be guided by the rational directive of the 
first principle of justice; thus, each liberty can be only 
limited "for the sake of liberty itself."55
Rawls asserts that the most fundamental of liberties 
is freedom of conscience, for the participants in th,e 
original position would need this principle in order to 
protect their rights to think for themselves, to speak 
their minds, and to live their own lives, apart from any
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oppressive religious or political dogma. In short, freedom 
of conscience is necessary to secure tolerance, both for 
oneself and for others. The principle of utility, however, 
would be rejected by the participants of the original 
position because "their freedom would be subject to . . . 
social interests . . .1,56 And for a rational person to 
subject himself or herself aoriori to the possibility of 
political or religious persecution or silence would be 
irrational and, therefore, unacceptable.
Reassessment
It is evident that the Supreme Court ought to have 
brought the central question of conflicting Constitutional 
rights clearly into its decision in Llovd and Hudgens. But 
in neither decision did the Court do so. Instead the Court 
opted to consider and reconsider certain facts in such a 
way that the Court could bend its decisions to its changing 
vision of free expression in shopping malls. By acting 
this way the Court breached the "story line" which began 
with Marsh and Logan. But as was discussed, the courts can 
find conflicting evidence to support contradictory 
decisions in the case law itself; thus, the Court's action 
in Llovd and Hudgens seems to be in keeping with the 
possibilities allowed in law (although the spirit of the 
Court's earlier decisions was surely violated). Still, 
Dworkin shows that the Court, in its interpretive position,
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ought to have considered the central question of 
conflicting liberties openly and in relation to the 
external political morality, instead of relegating this 
important question to the space of a footnote.
The external political morality, if considered in 
terms of tolerance and the first principle of justice, 
would surely give more emphasis to the practice of free 
expression than to the rights of property owners to exclude 
speech activities from their malls due to the priority of 
liberty of conscience. Yet, here Rawls' principle of 
tolerance would have to handle the question of future 
factual limitations of free expression in relation to the 
legitimate right of property ownership while also answering 
the interpretive question of how much influence the 
argument from utility should carry. Rawls' answer to the 
first of these problems is found in his statement that 
liberties of conscience can be only limited by "arguments 
[which] establish a reasonably certain interference with 
the essentials of public order."57 Certainly free 
expression in the shopping mall need not interfere with the 
essentials of public order. For people have used the town 
center as a place for both speech and commerce for fifty 
years under the protection of liberty without being 
construed as threatening the essential public order. To 
insure this the law could direct that speech in shopping 
malls be in keeping with the general atmosphere of the
place in the manner, time, and place of the activity. But 
the content of the speech should not be a concern of the 
courts. Such an opening for speech in the mall could allow 
handbilling and information tables regulated by the 
management to keep the commercial aspect of the mall vital. 
All people, with their manifold points of view, should be 
allowed access to the mall for such purposes. Yet, the 
property owners will argue that this activity will take 
away from the mall as a pleasant place to shop and from its 
sanctuary features, and, thus, people will no longer be 
attracted to its shops. From Rawls' theory one could argue 
that the utilitarian argument that the mall is 
fundamentally a place for commerce is unfair to those who 
need to communicate their ideas in a public setting. For 
the mall stands as a central gathering place for people of 
the community. Very few places in most communities attract 
a cross-section of the population throughout the day as the 
shopping mall does. And since the mall replaced the 
traditional gathering place, people ought to be able to 
exercise their most basic right of conscience in the 
privately owned shopping mall. If they are not allowed, 
they are being unfairly deprived of their liberty because a 
relatively few people replaced everyone's field for the 
exercise of free speech with an exclusive and privately 
owned place.
Final Verdict 
Since the Supreme Court failed to consider the 
question of principle openly and because the Court 
neglected the larger political morality of the community, 
the Court's decision in Llovd and Hudgens must be 
considered a mistake according to Dworkin's analysis. 
Furthermore, since the decision must be considered a 
mistake, the Court ought to take a hard look at any future 
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